Impudent practices by Standish, P
1 
 
Impudent Practices 
 
Paul Standish, Institute of Education, London 
 
 
Native speakers of English, at least those of a certain age, are most likely 
first to have heard the word “impudent” from a school-teacher: “How dare 
you be so impudent!”, “I have never heard such impudence”, and other 
similar expressions of outrage. If this is the intimidating context in which 
the word was learned, where it was difficult to ask what it actually meant, it 
was not hard to imagine that it referred to something inappropriate in 
behaviour, perhaps through incorrectly addressing a teacher or by doing 
something that could in some way or another be counted as “rude”, and 
rudeness is a thing about which children were and are encouraged to be 
preoccupied. In fact, “rude” is itself an interesting site of lexical tension for 
the child: originally meaning “plain” or “simple”, as in “a peasant’s rude 
dwelling”, its primary connotations for the school child were of impoliteness 
or of sexual explicitness or impropriety – as in rude words and rude jokes, or 
even rude parts of the body. “Impudent” is one of a strange class of words in 
English that are used only with a negative prefix or suffix, such as 
“unkempt”, “feckless”, “inept”, and “gormless”: none of these words exists in 
its positive form. Richard Rorty had some fun with the philosophically 
favoured word “ineffable”, which is one of this group, by wondering about 
how far the supposedly ineffable could be “effed”.i 
But the meaning of “impudent” can be rendered rather more precisely 
than the child’s understanding of “rude”, and in understanding this the 
sense of the negative will be important. The root of the word is pudendum, 
which the results of a quick Google search explain as follows: 
 
pudendum: 
The external genitals of either sex , though many limit the meaning to 
apply only to the female mons pubis , labia-majora , labia-minora , 
clitoris , and introitus vaginae. To avoid confusion a qualifier is 
sometimes used: male-pudendum , female-pudendum . See vagina for 
synonyms.  
ETYMOLOGY: In Latin it means ' that of which one should be 
ashamed a derivion [sic - i.e., derivation] of pudere, to be ashamed.ii 
 
The invocation of shame here is important, but also potentially misleading. 
The obvious implication of a definition such as this is that the genitals are 
inherently shameful, and hence they should be covered up: to be covered up 
is to show appropriate modesty in one’s behaviour. But there are other 
currents of meaning here, which these explanations and contrasts fail to 
realise. 
We saw that “impudent” is a word in English that does not have a 
positive form. In French, by contrast, it does. Pudeur is a term that is 
peculiarly difficult to translate, and it is important that “modesty” partly 
misses the point. Certainly pudeur involves a kind of restraint, but the 
relation between this and shame is rather different: pudeur can involve the 
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intensification of the attraction, and the sense of value, of what is hidden. 
Hence, what is hidden is not inherently shameful: rather the shame would 
consist in revealing something inappropriately. It involves then, and implies 
the desirability of, an indirect relationship to what is hidden, where 
indirectness is crucial to its proper appreciation: directness or immediacy 
would constitute a distortion or violation or obliteration of that thing. If we 
were talking of religious matters, the inappropriateness might be cast in 
terms of profanation. But the contrast can be evoked in terms of music and 
art.  Let me risk some examples, though perhaps all of these will be 
controversial in some way. One might think then of the qualities of restraint 
and understatement in Schubert’s piano music or songs in contrast with the 
full-blown expression of Wagner’s operas; or of Cole Porter (or The Smiths or 
Lily Allen?) in relation to punk rock. And perhaps it is instructive to think of 
the way that punk rock was soon followed in the 1980s and 90s by a new 
style of comedy that was blatantly “in your face” – that is, explicit, loud, 
crude. In art you might contrast the gentle suggestiveness of French 
painters such as Fragonard or, later, Renoir with the shock directness of 
Brit Art over the last twenty years or so, “full frontal” and sexually explicit. 
In each of these pairings the former orientation or style realises and 
preserves something that the latter obscures or destroys.iii 
 
Impudent education  
 
I want to play out this contrast by identifying a number of ways in which 
impudent practices – that is, practices characterised by an insistent and 
inappropriate explicitness - are currently found in education. Here are some 
examples. I present these assertively because the point of the present 
discussion is elsewhere. They are included not in order, as it were, to take 
up the argument once again but rather as orientations for what is to follow. 
The first two involve matters that are obviously educational; the latter pair 
relate to broader cultural, even metaphysical matters, though still with 
acute importance for education. 
 
(i) Outcomes-based learning 
 
Criticism of outcomes-based learning, both in research and amongst 
practitioners themselves, is now so extensive as not to need coverage here. It 
is important that this criticism is not in general directed at the fact that 
there are outcomes to educational practices (how could it reasonably be?), 
nor a denial that it is appropriate to assess these. The target is rather the 
ideology of outcomes-based education, expressible in the reductive idea that 
nothing is taught or learned unless it is tested and that performance in tests 
is the sole indicator that learning has taken place. Modern versions of this 
are derivative in some ways from earlier forms of behaviourism in education. 
Of course, in contemporary circumstances in many countries, the context 
for educational practice is a culture of accountability and transparency – 
both of which look like good democratic virtues but that succumb to a 
behaviourist anthropology and metaphysics.iv 
 
3 
 
(ii) Research methods and evidence 
 
The broad research culture in which many readers of this article will be 
working is currently dominated by an ideology of empiricism. Empiricism in 
this sense – where the suffix carries a pejorative force - is the view that the 
only way in which enquiry into education can be advanced is through 
empirical testing. It can embrace quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Empiricism typically hides from itself the reflective and speculative aspects 
to its own practices, specifically in the indentifying of a site for research and 
a research question, before the empirical research is carried out, and the 
similarly speculative elements in the interpretation of data. It is significant 
that “research ethics” is typically understood to relate to the procedural 
aspects of the research and not to the questions of value inherent in the 
stages of research I have mentioned. Questions of value are questions of 
ethics, and in many respects these are in effect repressed.v 
It is important to emphasise that to identify this ideology is in no way 
to criticise empirical research per se. There is every reason to engage in 
empirical research of quantitative and qualitative kinds, but there can be no 
reason for limiting research in the manner characteristic of empiricism. 
Empiricism - in the grip of the idea that there must be evidence open to 
view, whose confidence is currently bolstered by the vogue for evidence-
based policy and practice - is in some respects a latter-day manifestation of 
the logical positivism of the early 20th century. Central to logical positivism 
was the doctrine of verificationism, the idea that the meaning of a 
proposition is to be understood in terms of its method of verification, with 
the corollary that statements that cannot be verified are held to be 
meaningless. This is echoed in the contemporary nostrum that in the 
absence of evidence of learning outcomes, no learning teaching and learning 
are taking place.vi   
 
(iii) Identity and subjectivity 
 
The politics of identity and certain aspects of the culture of therapy have 
encouraged the view that differences are to be recognised in processes of 
explicit identification. This can encourage a self-consciousness about and a 
reification of identity, both of which are likely to have distorting or 
obliterating effects, in the manner described above.vii A problem now widely 
acknowledged in relation to this is the practice of the labelling of children, 
where the label is likely at the very least to involve a kind of reductivism: not 
only the complexity of the child’s character and circumstances but the very 
nature, the existential dynamics, of what it is to be a human being are in 
danger of being explained away. 
Once again, this is not to deny the importance of the political 
recognition of different groups or the benefits of therapies directed in one 
way or another towards self-knowledge. But it does throw light on what self-
knowledge might involve, dispelling any sense that this can be fully 
understood in terms of the uncovering of a set of truths about oneself. 
“Know thyself” remains an imperative of (self-)education, vulnerable though 
this can be to degenerate forms of understanding.viii 
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(iv) History and remembrance 
 
Uncovering sets of truths about oneself runs into the problem that we all 
come from origins we cannot fully know, cannot fathom. This is more the 
simple empirical point that there is more to our past that we can retrieve – 
that is, that there is too much data to be collected. The point is closer to the 
charge of anthropomorphism: that our attempts to recall our childhood are 
always inevitably refracted through our mature understanding and 
refashioned with the benefit of hindsight, however much we may try to 
compensate for these factors. Furthermore, there is the logical point that 
remembering necessarily involves highlighting some features of experience 
to the neglect of others, and the selection will inevitably be affected by the 
nature of one’s mature perception of the world and of one’s place in it.  
While this is also generally true in relation to the broader 
reconstruction that is history, the point acquires particular sharpness when 
it is related to the experience of traumaix – hence, the familiar failure of 
Holocaust films, which attempt to present unspeakable horrors to the 
audience but do this in circumstances already governed by the practices of 
production and consumption of the cinema industry. This reveals sharply a 
more general truth to the effect that history is simplified and tamed in the 
telling: there is a danger that the clarity and vividness of the account that is 
offered may create an illusion of understanding that blocks the relation to 
what is necessarily immemorial. Given that the memorial risks fossilising 
the past, the term “immemorial” has come to be used to refer precisely to 
what cannot be recaptured in memory, what must be for-gotten. But this 
does not leave us in a position where we can complacently forget: it is 
incumbent upon us not to forget the forgetting, to retain a sense of the 
immemorial. 
Jean-François Lyotard explores these themes of childhood and the 
immemorial in a number of works, perhaps most prominently in his books 
Lectures d’Enfance (1991) and Heidegger and “the jews” (1990). His work in 
these respects is a facet of what might be thought of as the theme of 
negativity that runs through aspects of poststructuralist thought. Negativity 
here should not be understood as impoverishment or deficiency but rather 
as a proper recognition of the limits of human knowing and the limits of 
language - that is, of human finitude. It is not the ground for frustration or 
despair but rather the very condition of human being, in the absence of 
recognition of which the possibilities and depths of being in the world are 
inevitably obscured.x 
 
Impudent knowingness 
 
Well over a century before Lyotard was writing, Ralph Waldo Emerson made 
some remarks that are pertinent to our theme. Himself no stranger to the 
problems of remembrance, he begins his essay “Experience” with the 
haunting and strangely contemporary question “Where shall we find 
ourselves?” The essay is in part an oblique meditation on the recent death of 
his five-year old son Waldo, but its tone is unexpected and defiant, in some 
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ways anticipating Nietzsche: “I grieve,” he writes, “that grief can teach me 
nothing.” 
Emerson is critical of practitioners of the then fashionable “science” of 
phrenology, which would explain everything, and calls them “theoretic 
kidnappers and slave-drivers” (Emerson, 1983, p. 475). The kidnappers are 
stealing, we can imagine, the possibility of responsible thought under the 
guise of spurious theorisations; they are slave-drivers in the sense that they 
force the operation of the intelligence into scientistic templates and protocols 
of procedure, which – if we can exercise some licence with the vocabulary – 
simultaneously dehumanises the researcher and the researched. It would 
surely be too cynical to imagine that educational research today is as 
confused and ill-conceived as phrenology, but there is reason to revisit some 
of its presuppositions, as manifested most clearly perhaps in the 
assumptions and orthodoxies of research methods training.xi In this respect 
it is worth remembering the tenor of Emerson’s response. “The grossest 
ignorance,” he writes, “does not disgust like this impudent knowingness” 
(ibid.). The somewhat awkward word “knowingness” refers, for example, to 
that familiar response of “the expert” who is immediately ready on hearing a 
new thought to arrest it into his already-worked-out conceptual armoury 
and theoretical taxonomy. He knows exactly where you are coming from, 
and before you have finished your paper or your sentence, he has “placed” 
your words: “So you are just saying that. . . What you are saying amounts to 
this. . . You are saying the same thing as. . .” For him it all comes down to 
this, and reductively so.xii And the consequence of this is that now that he 
has your ideas taped, his own position is buttressed and effectively secured 
against further thought – at least against any thought that does not run 
along the railway tracks of his own “theoretical perspective”. Richard Poirier 
explains this further:  
 
“Impudent knowingness” is knowingness that, resentful of anything it 
cannot explain, presumes to expose the mysterious sources of 
creation, whether of human offspring like Waldo or human offspring 
like literature; it exposes the genitalia, as if, by pointing to this or that 
or any other single organ, it could explain desire or the productivity of 
mind. That Emerson fully intends this sense of “impudent” becomes 
evident several pages further on when he remarks that “the art of life 
has a pudency that will not be exposed” (Poirier, 1992, p. 53). 
 
It is worth attending to the passage that leads up to the expression Poirier 
cites, for here Emerson praises and celebrates forms of indirectness in 
relation to beauty and truth, but with implications for our interaction with 
one another. In a different and more contemporary vocabulary, these might 
be referred to as “epistemic virtues”. And when he speaks of “genius”, a key 
term for Emerson, he is referring not to the exceptional individual so much 
as to that capacity for what is new within each of ourselves: 
  
The most attractive class of people are those who are powerful 
obliquely, and not by the direct stroke: men of genius, but not yet 
accredited: one gets the cheer of their light, without paying too great a 
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tax. Theirs is the beauty of the bird, or the morning light, and not of 
art. In the thought of genius there is always a surprise; and the moral 
sentiment is well called “the newness,” for it is never other; as new to 
the oldest intelligence as to the young child – “the kingdom that 
cometh without observation.” In like manner, for practical success, 
there must not be too much design. . . The art of life has a pudency, 
and will not be exposed (Emerson, 1983, p. 483). 
 
One can scarcely think of virtues such as these in the absence of the human 
capacity for learning, and for teaching. But they are not virtues contained in 
the individual: they have to do with how the world and how it allowed to 
appear. The paraphrasing and expropriation of the Lord’s Prayer (“Thy 
kingdom come, thy will be done. . .”) in “the kingdom that cometh without 
observation” underlines the seriousness – that is, the religious moment - 
with which Emerson takes these matters: 
“Experience”, we have seen, is an essay about loss, but it is important 
that it is not mournful about that loss. The baby gradually discovers that 
the world is not just an extension of her own body, not immediately within 
her grasp, and this may be the beginning of that continual lesson that the 
human condition is unheimlichxiii: to understand the world is to understand 
it as a place where she cannot be fully at home. And sometimes the adult 
has not discovered, or has declined to learn, that the objects of her 
understanding are not to be grasped and gripped, or clutched and 
controlled, not to be contained in concepts.xiv Then she is impudent, and a 
threat to our lives and world and education. Painful lessons, but they had 
better be learned! “I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects,” 
Emerson writes, “which lets them slip through our fingers then when we 
clutch hardest, to be the most unhandsome part of our condition” (p. 473). 
So the contrived and somewhat awkward negative form “unhandsome” 
might suggest that our condition is unbeautiful, which might be to say at 
the same time that we are something other than gods. But the embedding of 
“hand” in the expression also shows how our lives might be better – if, that 
is, we follow a thought, implicit here, that will be expressed over a century 
later by Heidegger to the effect that thinking is a handicraft. The craftsman 
works with the materials, feeling the resistances in the grain of the wood 
and releasing its possibilities (see Heidegger, 1976; also Cavell, 1990). The 
thinker, receptive, even reticent in some ways, is attuned to the possibilities 
of things, understanding that impudence here will allow things to slip away 
or crush them in its grasp.   
But to speak of receptivity or reticence here is not just to endorse 
passivity. Emerson’s work is suggestive throughout of a superfluity of 
energy, and this is evident in the functioning of language itself. The sense of 
what the world is, or of what we are to make of it or of ourselves, is forever 
opening to new possibilities. We find ourselves on a stair. Around every 
circle another can be drawn. Our finding is a founding, and at every step, 
every word, every thought there is the possibility of finding or founding 
something new. It is incumbent upon us to seek no less. It is through 
phrases and thoughts such as these that this excess energy surfaces. But 
this is an energy that will be dissipated if it is discharged without measure 
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or engaged with blunt instrumentality. It depends upon a certain 
indirectness or sublimation, which will refine it and intensify its charge. It 
requires not impudence but pudeur. 
 The examples of art images mentioned above divide in ways that are 
less clear-cut, less convenient, than might at first have been thought. There 
is a complicity, we might say, between modesty and seductiveness, and this 
is a signal characteristic of eros as classically conceived – and it is important 
that, in its classical conception, eros extends well beyond its contemporary 
confinement to the sexual. To understand this better it will be helpful, in the 
next section, to follow some thoughts regarding the erotic intensification of 
desire in education as expressed classically in Plato’s Symposium. 
But before this let us pause to acknowledge the place of thoughts 
such as these in Nietzsche, a philosopher, as has been intimated above, 
influenced so much by Emerson. Such thoughts are drawn out with 
particular subtlety by Jacques Derrida in his Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles. In 
phrasing that interweaves with this present discussion, Derrida refers to the 
“barely allegorical figure” of woman in Nietzsche’s writings on truth. For 
Nietzsche, Derrida writes, 
 
truth is like a woman. It resembles the veiled movement of feminine 
modesty [pudeur feminine]. Their complicity, the complicity (rather 
than the unity) between woman, life, seduction, modesty – all the 
veiled and veiling effects (Schleier, Enthülung, Verhüllung) – is 
developed in a barely quoted fragment of Nietsche’s. It is a deadly 
problem: that which reveals itself but once (das enthüllt sich uns 
einmal). Thus the final lines: “. . . for ungodly activity does not furnish 
us with the beautiful at all, or only does so once! I mean to say that 
the world is overfull of beautiful things, but it is nevertheless poor, 
very poor, in beautiful things. But perhaps this is the greatest charm 
(Zauber) of life: it puts a golden-embroidered veil (golddurch-wirkter 
Schleier) of lovely potentialities over itself, promising, resisting, modest 
[pudique], mocking, sympathetic, seductive. Yes, life is a woman!” 
(Derrida, 1979, pp. 50-53). 
 
Derrida goes on to quote the opening passage from Beyond Good and Evil. 
The quoted words are interspersed with Derrida’s parentheses: 
 
Supposing truth to be a woman – what? Is the suspicion not well-
founded that all philosophers, when they have been dogmatists, have 
had little understanding of women (sich schlecht auf Weiber 
verstanden, have been misunderstanding as to women?) that the 
gruesome earnestness, the clumsy importunity with which they have 
been in the habit of approaching truth have been inept and improper 
means (ungeschickte und unschickliche Mittel) for winning a wench 
(Frauenzimmer is a term of contempt: an easy woman)? (pp. 54-55)  
 
Truth will not let itself be won, Nietzsche claims; nor will truth be pinned 
down. “That which will not be pinned down by truth is, in truth – feminine,” 
Derrida explains. “This should not, however, be hastily mistaken for a 
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woman’s femininity, for female sexuality, or for any other of those 
essentializing fetishes which might still tantalize the dogmatizing 
philosopher, the impotent artist or the inexperienced seducer who has not 
yet escaped his foolish hopes of capture” (ibid.). Truth, as we sometimes say 
with a capital T, the “Truth” writ large, which is the earnest, dogmatic 
philosopher’s quest, is an illusory so-called truth; it deserves its scare-
quotes. By contrast, 
 
the blushing movement of that truth which is not suspended in 
quotation marks casts a modest veil over such a surface. And only 
through such a veil which thus falls over it could “truth” become 
truth, profound, indecent, desirable. But should that veil be 
suspended, or even fall a bit differently, there would no longer be any 
truth, only “truth” – written in quotation marks. Le voile/tombe (pp. 
58-59). 
 
Whereas nakedness is a condition we might be said to share with the 
animals, the possibilities of nudity and pudeur are alike necessarily 
understood in relation to clothing, or, to be more precise, to a kind of veiling; 
the history of sexual difference, whether revealed or dissimulated, be could 
scarcely be understood without this. The senses of arrangement and 
disarrangement, the lines of decency and indecency running like fissures 
through the tremors of desire, are plainly not static or timeless but dynamic. 
The proximity of le voile (veil) to la voile (sail) prompts Derrida, here and in 
various texts, to point towards truth not as towards something static but as 
necessitating a movement of turning and indirect journeying, by turns 
metaphorical and metonymic. How then are we to read the drama of eros in 
the Symposium? 
 
Eros dishevelled 
 
A symposium is originally a drinking party, and Plato’s dialogue depicts an 
occasion when each of the men around the table takes his turn in 
presenting a speech on the nature of love. The speeches are at once 
humorous and serious, and replete with both mythological reference and 
teasing banter between friends. Speech supersedes speech, and argument 
trumps argument, but it is in Socrates’ lengthy recounting of words he has 
heard from Diotima, the priestess of Mantineia, that the dialogue reaches its 
climax. And here there is an iteration of that idea of the refinement of desire 
and its redirection towards higher things that characteristically is taken to 
epitomise the presence of eros in education:  
 
“And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of 
love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts 
upward for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and 
from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from 
fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the 
notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of 
beauty is. This, my dear Socrates,” said the stranger of Mantineia, “is 
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that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation 
of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see 
not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and 
youths, which when you now behold you are in fond amazement, and 
you and many a one are content to live seeing only and conversing 
with them without meat or drink, if that were possible – you only want 
to be with them and to look at them. But what if man had eyes to see 
the true beauty – the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and 
unalloyed, not clogged with the pollution of mortality, and all the 
colors and vanities of human life – thither looking, and holding 
converse with the true beauty divine and simple, and bringing into 
being and educating true creations of virtue and not idols only? Do 
you not see that in that communion only, beholding beauty with the 
eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of 
beauty, but realities; for he has not of an image but of a reality, and 
bringing forth and educating true virtue to become the friend of god 
and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?” 
(Plato, Symposium, pp. 211-212).  
 
This appears to be the heart of the Platonic rationale for education, where 
natural desires are refined through their direction towards objects of beauty 
and then towards beauty itself, in steps towards the higher, where goodness 
and truth are one. 
In another dialogue, the Cratylus, which treats questions concerning 
the nature of language, we find Socrates speculating on etymology in such a 
way as to connect the figure of the hero with eros and with the asking of 
questions. All the heroes, he claims,   
 
sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman, or of a 
mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old Attic, and you 
will see better that the name heros is only a slight alteration of Eros, 
from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the meaning, or, if not 
this, then they have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and 
able to put the question (erotan), for eirein is equivalent to legein. And 
therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be 
rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed 
of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors (Plato, Cratylus, pp. 
398).xv 
 
Legein is the verb form of logos, whose sense in Greek is altogether wider 
than “logic” in contemporary English. It includes the senses not only of 
reasoning but of speaking, and also of gathering, and even of making one’s 
way. Socrates’ placing of the idea of questioning in relation to this connects 
pointedly with his own practice in thinking, which is quintessentially a 
practice of asking questions. His manner of enquiry and (famously) his 
manner of teaching alike are characterised by questioning. And if 
questioning is oriented towards the truth, it cannot have the brutal 
directness of, say, police interrogation. The interrogator, we can imagine, 
thinks she knows in advance the way the truth must bexvi; the questioner, 
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by contrast, has only a provisional, revisable sense of this, and is ready to 
adjust the line of questioning, ready, word by word, to find new foundations 
for thought. The interrogator, we might add, sees the suspect as a means to 
the truth; the questioner sees the learner as someone in whom truth is to be 
realised. Moreover, if Socrates as the teacher-questioner approaches the 
learner often by roundabout routes, working through digressions and false 
turns in the conversation towards a progressive refinement and 
intensification of the enquiry, ready to follow, though gently to redirect, the 
learner’s sometimes wayward responses, the interrogator has contrived her 
approach with brutal calculation, fixed on the predetermined end. If the 
former is characterised by a kind of pudeur, the latter is plainly impudent. 
It is common in the literature to read accounts of “Plato’s theory” of 
education or of the state, but there is something deeply misleading about 
this. Plato tells us very little about what he thinks. He writes dialogues, or 
play-scripts, if you will, that depict Socrates in conversation with various 
people, typically involving at least one younger man. This will be a young 
man in whom Socrates has an interest, but his interest is, if nothing else, in 
that young man’s education, and this is realised in conversation. Modern 
versions of “Socratic pedagogy” woefully misunderstand what is at stake 
here when they reduce what Socrates is about to a technique, a technique of 
questioning - little more sometimes than a benign form of interrogation. This 
obscures important facets of the scene of teaching that Plato depicts, in 
which the fact that this is conversation is crucial. One such facet has to do 
with the manner in which the learner makes his progress towards the truth, 
not typically in a simply linear pattern but with some false steps, some 
meandering, and often some humour on the way: however rigorous or 
precise Socrates’ questioning can be made to seem, this is quite unlike 
programmed learning. A second has to do with the importance of Socrates’ 
exposure in this scene and his obvious emotional investment in what is 
happening. And, third, there is the very nature of the content of enquiry, the 
nature of the truth itself, of its inherent value, its worthiness of 
contemplation, which is poorly and too crudely understood in terms of the 
Forms – that is, the Forms that have come down to us in a certain 
“Platonism”, where it can seem as if we are to imagine them ready and 
available on the metaphysical shelf. The content of enquiry is realised in the 
dynamics of conversation: it is there that truth dawns, there where it 
becomes real, and, if the present attempt to follow through this account of 
eros is accurate, it can only become real where it is approached with 
appropriate pudeur. 
This, then, is where the dialogue reaches its climax, with the 
evocation of the refinement of desire and its redirection towards higher 
things. This, at least, is what we thought we saw. But matters do not end 
there, and the drama is not closed. For this high point in the ascending 
series of speeches, this apparent culmination, is soon undone. There is a 
knock at the door, and voices are heard. It is a loud knocking. Who is it? 
Should they be let in or politely told that the party has ended? And the 
person who is more or less barging his way in turns out to be none other 
than the beautiful Alcibiades, plainly intoxicated and visibly distressed. He 
is distressed because he finds himself, perhaps against his inclination, 
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drawn back to Socrates. He is drawn back in spite of the popularity he 
enjoys amongst the Athenians; and painfully so as Socrates is the only 
person who makes him feel ashamed, angry at the thought of his own 
slavish state (215e). Although he cannot exactly disagree with what Socrates 
says to him, he experiences the attraction neither as gentle questioning (say, 
the actions of a benign midwife), nor yet as something like the inspired 
recounting of Diotima’s words: it is simply not, or not simply, elevating in 
that way. It is experienced rather as the flute-playing of a satyr (216-217). 
He insists on and demonstrates the aptness of this image of Socrates. 
Socrates is ugly; he is a bully; he is a possessor of souls. And philosophy 
itself is not exactly, or not solely, the ascent towards the higher that the 
quoted words of Diotima words depict, but something more like the pangs of 
being bitten, by the viper that Socrates is. This is not so much a steady, 
upward progression towards the light, but rather a wrestling with 
troublesome, unfulfilled desire - a desire whose satisfaction is not to be 
found quite as one might expect: having spent a winter night with Socrates, 
under Socrates’ threadbare cloak, with this “wonderful monster” in his 
arms, he rises in the morning, rejected, “as from the couch of a father or an 
elder brother” (209, c-d). The covering has hidden nothing, or at least not 
what was expected, in this ambiguous, erotic interplay of revealing and 
concealing. Many are the wonders of Socrates, and yet “his words are 
ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in language that is 
the skin of the wanton satyr” (221, e). To strip away this clothing, to pierce 
the mask, will reveal “the only words which have a meaning in them, and 
also the most divine” - but this comes about only in a faltering way, as if in 
a movement that by turns reveals and veils (222, a). This is Alcibiades’ 
praise but also his blaming of Socrates for the ill-treatment he has received, 
which should serve as a warning to others. Alcibiades exhausts himself with 
his impassioned speech, the drama effectively upstaging the high-point of 
Socrates’ sublime words (though a narrowly “philosophical” reading will 
surely miss this): those words are not subverted so much as disarranged. 
Alcibiades has arrived dishevelled and unkempt, turning the symposium 
into disarray: his drunkenness at this drinking-party, the passion of his 
outburst, subverts the wit of the earlier speeches; and the truths he speaks 
set on the line the relationship between sobriety and intoxication, between 
reason and madness. All this reflects a troubled state: the birth pangs of a 
philosophy that is not simply clear but alloyed with “the pollution of 
mortality”, earthy, dramatic, indecorous, and dynamic. This is the eros to 
which we are lead. 
How interesting to note then that “dishevelled” and “unkempt” are 
words, once again, that exist only in this negative form. What does this say 
of the disarrangements of appearance they imply? The art of education has a 
pudency that will not be exposed. 
Conclusions prudent and impudent 
This is really where I would like to end, but can we stop like this? Let me 
end then with a confession. I presented an earlier version of this paper at 
the annual Oxford Conference of the Philosophy of Education Society of 
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Great Britain. On that occasion I was torn between, on the one hand, 
leaving the text as it is above, with implications, so it seemed to me, that 
unfolded subtly perhaps but naturally enough, and, on the other, setting 
out a little more explicitly the practical significance I had in mind. In the 
end, and with some misgivings on the grounds that this might seem too 
literal, I opted for the latter. What I said went roughly along the following 
lines. 
 
The account I had developed could fruitfully be interpreted, I 
suggested, in relation to the so-called sacred triangle of education, 
which brings together teacher, learner, and content (whatever it is 
that is to be learned). I presented this diagrammatically, stressing that 
it was the relation between the three points that was crucial to 
education. Each of these points on its own was subject to a kind of 
inflammation – to an over-emphasis that would draw energy away 
from the others, in a manner that could involve a distortion of 
education and a diminishment of its dynamism. This would be so 
especially where a cause was being championed – a change of 
emphasis, a new approach – and where, in the course of policy-
making, of expounding a new theory, or writing a new book, the case 
for one or the other needed to be set out loud and clear. I sketched the 
forms such inflammation might take, roughly as follows: 
 
1. Overemphasis on the teacher 
A characteristic vice here would be to see the teacher as the 
repository of knowledge, the one with all the answers, in a 
manner that would stifle humility in relation to the engagement 
of education, stifling this both in the teacher and in her 
students. Where a teacher was prized especially for her 
charisma, Hollywood-fashion, this would be an educational 
version of the cult of personality, leading the attention of 
learners too much towards the person, insufficiently towards 
what it was that was to be learned.  
 
2. Overemphasis on what was to be learned 
The danger here would be that the response of the student was 
overwhelmed by a kind of deference to content, whether this 
was to the bodies of knowledge of a traditional curriculum or to 
the skills and competences that have generally become more 
prominent in contemporary education. 
 
3. Overemphasis on the learner 
The problem here arose where the understandable concern with 
individual learners and existing interests and motivation 
deflected attention from the matter of education, from the need 
to ensure that what was to be studied was indeed something 
worthy of attention and might be something the students could 
not yet understand. 
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Each of these forms of inflammationxvii, I claimed, took the life-blood 
away from what we might think of as the conversation of education, to 
reappropriate Michael Oakeshott’s celebrated phrasexviii and to echo 
the account developed above: “The content of enquiry is realised,” I 
repeated, “in the dynamics of conversation: it is there that truth 
dawns, there where it becomes real, and, if the present attempt to 
follow through this account of eros is accurate, it can only become 
real where it is approached with appropriate pudeur.” A conversation 
must be between people and about something, I continued, but what 
exactly would make for a good conversation was rather more difficult 
to define. Overemphasis on the relationship between people would 
lose sight of the significance of sharing a topic of concern. 
Preoccupation with that topic could deaden the relationship to the 
other person. There was something elusive, then, at the heart of this, 
something that, given too explicit a formulation, could easily be 
destroyed. To do so would be a form of impudence. To show restraint 
here, appreciative of this web of relationships, would be to think and 
respond with the pudency that education needed.  
 
This roughly was how I ended my presentation. But then, to my surprise, 
the audience rounded on me. Or, to be explicit, first a couple and then 
several others began to slate my conclusion. My paper had been developed 
persuasively up to a certain point. Why was it that I needed the sacred 
triangle? Why spell it out, spoiling it, in this way? Surely this was at odds 
with the substance of what I had said, which, they seemed to think, was 
sufficiently articulate by itself. 
I confess that I did not entirely share their view. The implications, as I 
have said, seemed to me to follow naturally enough, and I did not think 
there was a problem in being more explicit here, perhaps for those to whom 
this was less apparent. In any case, so I thought, these connections were 
there. Looking back on this, I would still hold on to the significance of the 
idea of the triangle as a means of indicating the dynamic field of teaching 
and learning, but it has come to seem to me that my attempt to be clear and 
reasonably explicit may have been somewhat imprudent – the imprudence of 
a kind of impudence. Hence, my inclination in conclusion is to recall the 
thought of that pudency in education that will not be exposed. 
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i Which in turn, if it is not already obvious, alludes also to what is coyly 
referred to as the “F-word”. The lexical tensions abound.  
ii See http://www.sex-lexis.com/Sex-Dictionary/pudendum (accessed on 4 
October 2011). 
iii The contrasts, which are being drawn too quickly here, are intended to 
serve partly as a heuristic, and they scarcely do justice to Brit Art. However 
much qualities of brashness may be apparent, there is more going on. 
Damien Hirst’s diamond-skull, entitled For the Love of God (2007), invites 
interpretation in multiple ways – say, as a comment on the art market or in 
relation to the vanity of human desire. (Online at: 
http://www.damienhirst.com/for-the-love-of-god. Accessed 20 July 2014.) 
Tracey Emin’s “tent”, entitled Everyone I Have Ever Slept With 1963–1995 
(1995), repudiates hasty responses when one is reminded of the different 
reasons why one might sleep alongside someone else (the period in question 
dates from the time of the artist’s birth), while the particular nature of the 
tent itself (a poleless igloo rather than a ridge tent) has feminine rather than 
masculine connotations. (Online at: 
http://www.saatchigallery.com/aipe/tracey_emin.htm. Accessed 20 July 
2014.) 
iv For the background to these claims, see Standish,  
1991,1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2010, 2013. 
v For examples of the arguments behind these claims, see Hodgson and 
Standish, 2008, and Standish, 2001. 
vi The point being emphasised here is the conceptual lineage of these ways of 
thinking and the continuing effects of the now discredited logical positivism 
that was in its hey-day in philosophy some sixty to ninety years ago. For 
further discussion, see, for example, Standish, 2012. 
vii See, for example, Standish,1995. 
viii See, for example, Standish, 2003, 2009. 
ix There is a new historiography that has developed around this - see, for 
example, Dominick LaCapra. See also Standish, 2008. 
x Derrida and Levinas might be seen as working with this negativity of 
thought, while Kierkegaard and, before him, the negative theology of Meister 
Eckhart and Angelus Silesius figure in the background. It can be contrasted 
with an affirmative strand in poststructuralism exemplified by Deleuze and, 
to some extent, Foucault, as well as by Lyotard in some phases of his 
writings. For a fuller account, see Standish, 2004. 
xi See Stone, 2006, and Hodgson and Standish, 2006. 
xii Knowingness of this kind has contributed to gross distortions in the 
reading of poststructuralist thought in educational research: to put this 
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briefly, the terms of poststructuralism were grafted onto the well-established 
growths of neo-marxist new sociology of knowledge and of identity politics in 
the name of something that came to be known as “postmodernist 
educational research”. 
xiii See Heidegger, 1978. 
xiv Note the etymological embedding of such ideas of containment and 
gripping in “concept” and Begriff, the philosopher’s stock-in-trade. 
xv The etymologising in Plato’s text has been criticised, but there is in 
contemporary research, it seems, a prevailing view that confirms the 
derivation of ήρως (hero) either from ερως (love) or from ερειν (say, speak). I 
am grateful to Marianna Papastephanou for advice about this. 
xvi Of course it depends what crime series you watch. Plainly this is a 
caricature. 
xvii As also for further forms of education that could be elaborated, where, for 
example, one side of the triangle – say the personal relationship between 
teacher and student – is given prominence at the expense of attention to 
content, the proper focus of that relationship. 
xviii Oakeshott speaks of “the conversation of mankind” (Oakeshott, 1959). 
